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Abstract. Secure delegated quantum computing allows a computation-
ally weak client to outsource an arbitrary quantum computation to an
untrusted quantum server in a privacy-preserving manner. One of the
promising candidates to achieve classical delegation of quantum compu-
tation is classical-client remote state preparation (RSPCC), where a client
remotely prepares a quantum state using a classical channel. However,
the privacy loss incurred by employing RSPCC as a sub-module is unclear.
In this work, we investigate this question using the Constructive Cryp-
tography framework by Maurer and Renner [MR11]. We first identify the
goal of RSPCC as the construction of ideal RSP resources from classical
channels and then reveal the security limitations of using RSPCC. First,
we uncover a fundamental relationship between constructing ideal RSP
resources (from classical channels) and the task of cloning quantum states.
Any classically constructed ideal RSP resource must leak to the server the
full classical description (possibly in an encoded form) of the generated
quantum state, even if we target computational security only. As a conse-
quence, we find that the realization of common RSP resources, without
weakening their guarantees drastically, is impossible due to the no-cloning
theorem. Second, the above result does not rule out that a specific RSPCC
protocol can replace the quantum channel at least in some contexts, such
as the Universal Blind Quantum Computing (UBQC) protocol of Broad-
bent et al. [BFK09]. However, we show that the resulting UBQC protocol
cannot maintain its proven composable security as soon as RSPCC is used
as a subroutine. Third, we show that replacing the quantum channel of
the above UBQC protocol by the RSPCC protocol QFactory of Cojocaru
et al. [CCKW19] preserves the weaker, game-based, security of UBQC.
Keywords: Remote State Preparation, Blind Quantum Computing
1 Introduction
The expected rapid advances in quantum technologies in the decades to come are
likely to further disrupt the field of computing. To fully realize the technological
potential, remote access, and manipulation of data must offer strong privacy and
integrity guarantees and currently available quantum cloud platform designs have
still a lot of room for improvement.
There is a large body of research that exploits the client-server setting
defined in [Chi05] to offer different functionalities, including secure delegated
quantum computation [BFK09, MF13, DFPR14, Bro15a, Mah18a, Fit17], verifi-
able delegated quantum computation [ABOE08, RUV12, FK17, HM15, Bro15b,
FHM18, TMM+18, Mah18b, GKK19, Vid20], secure multiparty quantum com-
putation [KP17, KMW17, KW17], and quantum fully homomorphic encryption
[BJ15, DSS16]. It turns out that one of the central building blocks for most of
these protocols is secure remote state preparation (RSP) that was first defined
in [DKL12]. At a high level, RSP resources enable a client to remotely prepare
a quantum state on the server side and are, therefore, the natural candidate to
replace quantum channel resources in a modular fashion. These resources further
appear to enable a large ecosystem of composable protocols [DKL12, DFPR14], in-
cluding in particular the Universal Blind Quantum Computation (UBQC) [BFK09]
protocol used to delegate a computation to a remote quantum server who has no
knowledge of the ongoing computation.
However, in most of the above-mentioned works, the users and providers do
have access to quantum resources to achieve their goals, in particular to quantum
channels in addition to classical communication channels. This might prove to be
challenging for some quantum devices, e.g. those with superconducting qubits,
and in general, it also restricts the use of these quantum cloud services to users
with suitable quantum technology.
Motivated by these practical constraints, [CCKW18] introduced a protocol
mimicking this remote state preparation resource over a purely classical channel
(under the assumption that the learning-with-error (LWE) problem is computa-
tionally hard for quantum servers). This is a cryptographic primitive between
a fully classical client and a server (with a quantum computer). By the end of
the interactive protocol the client has “prepared” remotely on the server’s lab, a
quantum state (typically a single qubit |+θ〉 := 1√2 (|0〉+ e
iθ |1〉)). This protocol
further enjoys some important privacy guarantees concerning the prepared state.
The important role of such a classical RSP primitive as part of larger protocols
– most notably in their role in replacing quantum channels between client and
server – stems from their ability to make the aforementioned protocols available
to classical users, in particular clients without quantum-capable infrastructure
on their end. It is therefore of utmost importance to develop an understanding of
this primitive, notably its security guarantees when composed in larger contexts
such as in [GV19].
In this paper, we initiate the study of analyzing classical remote state-
preparation from first principles. We thereby follow the Constructive Cryp-









Fig. 1: Ideal resource SZπ2
RSP primitive from a composable perspective. (Note that the framework is also
referred to as Abstract Cryptography (AC) in earlier works.) Armed with such a
definition, we then investigate the limitations and possibilities of using classical
RSP both in general and in more specific contexts.
1.1 Overview of our Contributions
In this work, we cover the security of RSPCC, the class of remote state preparation
protocols which only use a classical channel, and the use-case that corresponds to
its arguably most important application: Universal Blind Quantum Computing
(UBQC) protocols with a completely classical client. The UBQC protocol can
be divided in two stages: first, the client needs to send random |+θ〉 (with
θ ∈ {0, π4 , . . . , 7π4 }) to the server, and after this initial quantum interaction,
the communication is purely classical. In this work, we analyze the security of
UBQCCC, the family of protocols where a protocol in RSPCC is used to replace the
initial quantum interaction from the original quantum-client UBQC protocol. An
example of an RSP resource is the SZπ2 resource where Zπ/2 = {0, π/2, π, 3π/2}
depicted in Fig. 1 outputting the quantum state |+θ〉 on its right interface, and
the classical description of this state, θ, on its left interface.
In Section 3, we show a wide-ranging limitation to the universally composable
guarantees that any protocol in the family RSPCC can achieve. The limitation
follows just from the relation between (i) the notion of classical realization and
(ii) a property we call describability – which roughly speaking measures how
leaky an RSP resource is, i.e. what amount of information about the classical
description of the final state can be extracted by an unbounded malicious server.
We emphasize that even if this specific property is an information-theoretic notion,
our final impossibility result also targets computational security. The limitation
directly affects the amount of additional leakage on the classical description of
the quantum state. In this way, it rules out a wide set of desirable resources, even
against computationally bounded distinguishers.
Theorem 1 (Security Limitations of RSPCC). Any RSP resource, realizable by
an RSPCC protocol with security against quantum polynomial-time distinguishers,
must leak an encoded, but complete description of the generated quantum state to
the server.
The importance of Theorem 1 lies in the fact that it is drawing a connection
between the composability of an RSPCC protocol – a computational notion – with
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Fig. 2: Idea of the proof of impossibility of composable RSPCC, exemplified by the
SZπ2 primitive from Fig. 1. π̃B runs the same computations as πB by emulating
it. In this way, the classical description of the quantum state can be extracted.
the statistical leakage of the ideal functionality it is constructing – an information-
theoretic notion. This allows us to use fundamental physical principles such as
no-cloning or no-signaling in the security analysis of computationally secure
RSPCC protocols. As one direct application of this powerful tool, we show that
secure implementations of the ideal resource in Fig. 1 give rise to the construction
of a quantum cloner, and are hence impossible.
Proof sketch. While Theorem 1 applies to much more general RSP resources
having arbitrary behavior at its interfaces and targeting any output quantum
state, for simplicity we exemplify the main ideas of our proof for the ideal resource
SZπ2 . The composable security of a protocol realizing SZπ2 implies, by definition,
the existence of a simulator σ which turns the right interface of the ideal resource
into a completely classical interface as depicted in Fig. 2. Running the protocol
of the honest server with access to this classical interface allows the distinguisher
to reconstruct the quantum state |+θ〉 the simulator received from the ideal
resource. Since the distinguisher also has access to θ via the left interface of the
ideal resource, it can perform a simple measurement to verify the consistency of
the state obtained after interacting with the simulator. By the correctness of the
protocol, the obtained quantum state |+θ〉 must therefore indeed comply with θ.
We emphasize that this consistency check can be performed efficiently, i.e. by
polynomially-bounded quantum distinguishers.
Since the quantum state, |+θ〉, is transmitted from σ to the distinguisher over
a classical channel, the ensemble of exchanged classical messages must contain a
complete encoding of the description of the state, θ. A (possibly computationally
unbounded) algorithm can hence extract the actual description of the state using
a classical emulation of the honest server. This property of the ideal resource is
central to our proof technique, we call it describability.
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Having a full description of the quantum state produced by SZπ2 would allow
us to clone it, a procedure prohibited by the no-cloning theorem. We conclude
that the resource SZπ2 cannot be constructed from a classical channel only.
One could attempt to modify the ideal resource, to incorporate such an
extensive leakage, which is necessary as the above proof implies. However, this
yields an ideal resource that is not a useful idealization or abstraction of the real
world (because it is fully leaky, i.e. reveals to a malicious server the full classical
description of the state) which puts in question whether they are at all useful in a
composable analysis. Indeed, ideal resources are typically described in a way that
it is obvious that they are secure (i.e. in a perfect, ideal sense), and we can then
claim that a protocol is secure because it is (for any computationally bounded
distinguisher) indistinguishable from the perfectly secure resource. Consider for
example constructions of composite protocols that utilize a (non-leaky) ideal
resource as a sub-module, say that leaks only the size of an encrypted message.
These constructions require a fresh security analysis if the sub-module is replaced
by any leaky version of it (like a resource leaking a specific encrypted form of the
real message), but since the modified resource is very specific and not trivially
secure, it appears that this replacement does not give any benefit compared
to directly using the implementation as a subroutine and then examining the
composable security of the combined protocol as a whole. This latter way is
therefore examined next.
More precisely, we might still be able to use RSPCC protocols as a subroutine
in other, specific protocols, and expect the overall protocol to still construct a
useful ideal functionality. The protocol family UBQCCC is such an application.
Unfortunately, as we show in Section 4, UBQCCC fails to provide the expected
composable security guarantees once classical remote state preparation is used
to replace the quantum channel from client to server (where composable security
for UBQC refers to the goal of achieving the established ideal functionality
of [DFPR14] which we recall in Section 4). This holds even if the distinguisher is
computationally bounded.
Theorem 3 (Impossibility of UBQCCC). No RSPCC protocol can replace the
quantum channel in the UBQC protocol while preserving composable security.
Proof sketch. To prove the impossibility of UBQCCC protocol we show that there
does not exist any simulator that can be attached to the ideal UBQC functionality
to emulate the behavior of concrete UBQCCC protocol. This UBQCCC uses any
RSPCC protocol as a subroutine in the UBQC protocol of [BFK09] to enable the
delegation of quantum computation with a completely classical-client. The proof
proceeds in three steps. Firstly, we realize that the possibility of a composable
UBQCCC protocol, which delegates arbitrary quantum computation, can be
reduced to the possibility of any composable UBQCCC protocol that delegates
single-qubit quantum computation. The latter protocol is much simpler to analyze.
Next, we present a connection between the single-qubit UBQCCC and the RSP
functionality. This step allows us to employ the toolbox we developed for our
previous result (Theorem Theorem 1). Finally, we show that the existence of
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a simulator for such an RSP functionality (that leaks the classical description,
even in the form of an encoded message) would violate the no-signaling principle.
Therefore, via this series of reduction, we show that the UBQC functionality, as
defined in [DFPR14], cannot be realized with only a classical channel by any
UBQCCC protocol of this kind (the one which uses RSP functionality to replace
quantum channel in UBQC protocol).
In Section 5, we show that the protocol family RSPCC contains protocols
with reasonably restricted leakage that can be used as subroutines in specific
applications resulting in combined protocols that offer a decent level of security.
Specifically, we prove the blindness property of QF-UBQC, a concrete UBQCCC
protocol that consists of the universal blind quantum computation (UBQC)
protocol of [BFK09] and the specific LWE-based remote state preparation (RSPCC)
protocol from [CCKW19]. This yields the first provably secure UBQCCC protocol
from standard assumptions with a classical RSP protocol as a subroutine.
Theorem 4 (Game-Based Security of QF-UBQC). The universal blind quantum
computation protocol with a classical client UBQCCC that combines the RSPCC
protocol of [CCKW19] and the UBQC protocol of [BFK09] is blind in the game-
based setting. We call this protocol QF-UBQC.
The statement of Theorem 4 can be summarized as follows: No malicious (but
computationally bounded) server in the QF-UBQC protocol could distinguish
between two runs of the protocol performing different computations. This holds
even when it is the adversary that chooses the two computations that it will be
asked to distinguish. The security is achieved in the plain model, i.e., without
relying on additional setup such as a measurement buffer. The protocol itself is
a combination of UBQC with the QFactory protocol. For every qubit that the
client would transmit to the server in the original UBQC protocol, QFactory is
invoked as a subprocedure to the end of remotely preparing the respective qubit
state on the server over a classical channel.
Proof sketch. By a series of games, we show that the real protocol on a single
qubit is indistinguishable from a game where the adversary guesses the outcome
of a hidden coin flip. We generalize this special case to the full protocol on
arbitrary quantum computation with a polynomial number of qubits by induction
over the size of the computation.
1.2 Related Work
While RSPCC was first introduced in [CCKW18] (under a different terminology),
(game-based) security was only proven against weak (honest-but-curious) adver-
saries. Security against malicious adversaries was proven for a modified protocol
in [CCKW19], where a verifiable version of RSPCC was also given, but security
was not proven in full generality. This protocol, called QFactory, is the basis of
the positive results in this work. It is important to note that [CCKW19] only
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shows the (game-based) security of QFactory whereas, in this work, we prove the
(game-based) security of a classical-client delegated quantum computing protocol
that uses QFactory as a subroutine. QFactory was also used as a sub-module by
[Zha20] to design a blind quantum computing scheme with a succinct quantum
client. In parallel [GV19] gave another protocol that offers a stronger notion of
verifiable RSPCC and proved the security of their primitive in the CC framework.
The security analysis, however, requires the assumption of a measurement buffer
resource in addition to the classical channel to construct a verifiable RSPCC. The
ideal functionality of the measurement buffer takes from Alice a classical message
x and from Bob a classical message ξ corresponding to the measurement opera-
tion along with a quantum state ρ, respectively, and outputs the measurement
outcome ξ(x, ρ) to both Alice and Bob. Bob also receives the post-measurement
quantum state. Our result confirms that this measurement buffer resource is a
strictly non-classical assumption.
In the information-theoretic setting with perfect security (leaking at most the
input size), the question of secure delegation of quantum computation with a
completely classical client was first considered in [MK14]. The authors showed
a negative result by presenting a scheme-dependent impossibility proof. This
was further studied in [DK16, ACGK19] which showed that such a classical
delegation would have implications in computational complexity theory. To be
precise, [ACGK19] conjecture that such a result is unlikely by presenting an
oracle separation between BQP and the class of problems that can be classically
delegated with perfect security (which is equivalent to the complexity class
NP/poly ∩ coNP/poly as proven by [AFK87]). On the other hand, a different
approach to secure delegated quantum computation with a completely classical
client, without going via the route of RSPCC, was also developed in [MDMF17]
where the server is computationally unbounded and in [Mah18a, Bra18] with
the computationally bounded server. The security was analyzed for the overall
protocol (rather than using a module to replace quantum communication). It
is worth noting that [MDMF17] is known to be not composable secure in the
Constructive Cryptography framework [Man19].
2 Preliminaries
We assume basic familiarity with quantum computing, for a detailed introduction,
see [NC00] (in this paper we only deal with finite dimensional Hilbert spaces).
2.1 The Constructive Cryptography Framework
There exists a few frameworks [BOM04, Unr04, Unr10, MR11] for general com-
posability in the quantum world. We chose to use the Constructive Cryptography
(CC) framework mostly because its abstraction levels allow having a result that
is independent of any universal quantum computation model. Also, using CC
is a common approach to analyze both classical as well as quantum primitives,
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and their composable security guarantees in general and in related works includ-
ing [DFPR14, MK13, DK16, GV19]. However, our results should be easy to port
to other general composable frameworks.
The Constructive Cryptography (CC) framework (also sometimes referred
to as the Abstract Cryptography (AC) framework) introduced by Maurer and
Renner [MR11] is a top-down and axiomatic approach, where the desired function-
ality is described as an (ideal) resource S with a certain input-output behavior
independent of any particular implementation scheme. A resource has some
interfaces I corresponding to the different parties that could use the resource. In
our case, we will have only two interfaces corresponding to Alice (the client) and
Bob (the server), therefore I = {A,B}. Resources are not just used to describe
the desired functionality (such as a perfect state preparation resource), but also
to model the assumed resources of a protocol (e.g., a communication channel).
The second important notion is the converter which, for example, is used to
define a protocol. Converters always have two interfaces, an inner and an outer
one, and the inner interface can be connected to the interface of a resource. When
we denote by πARπB we refer to connecting the inner interfaces of πA and πB
to the interfaces A and B of the resource R.
To characterize the distance between two resources (and therefore the security),
we use the so-called distinguishers. We then say that two resources S1 and S2 are
indistinguishable (within ε), and denote it as S1 ≈ε S2, if no distinguisher can
distinguish between S1 and S2 with an advantage greater than ε. In the following,
we will mostly focus on quantum polynomial-time (QPT) distinguishers.
Central to Constructive Cryptography is the notion of a secure construction
of an (ideal) resource S from an assumed resource R by a protocol (specified
as a pair of converters). We directly state the definition for the special case we
are interested in, namely in two-party protocols between a client A and a server
B, where A is always considered to be honest. The definition can therefore be
simplified as follows:
Definition 1 (See [Mau11, MR11]). Let I = {A,B} be a set of two inter-
faces (A being the left interface and B the right one), and let R,S be two resources.
Then, we say that for the two converters πA, πB, the protocol π := (πA, πB) (se-
curely) constructs S from R within ε, or that R realizes S within ε if the following
two conditions are satisfied:
1. Availability (i.e. correctness):
πARπB ≈ε S ` (1)
(where ` represents a filter, i.e. a trivial converter that enforces honest/correct
behavior, and A ≈ε B means that no quantum polynomial-time (QPT) dis-
tinguisher can distinguish between A and B (given black-box access to A or
B) with an advantage better than ε)
2. Security: there exists σ ∈ Σ (called a simulator) such that:
πAR ≈ε Sσ (2)
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We also extend this definition when ε is a function ε : N→ R: we say that S is
ε-classically-realizable if for any n ∈ N, S is ε(n)-realizable.
In our work, we instantiate a general model of computation to capture general
quantum computations within converters which ensures that they follow the laws
of quantum physics (e.g., excluding that the input-output behavior is signaling).
Indeed, without such a restriction, we could not base our statements on results
from quantum physics, because an arbitrary physical reality may not respect
them, such as cloning of quantum states, signaling, and more. More specifically,
in this work, we assume that any converter that interacts classically on its inner
interface and outputs a single quantum message on its outer interface can be
represented as a sequence of quantum instruments (which is a generalization of
CPTP maps taking into account both quantum and classical outputs, see [DL70])
and constitutes the most general expression of allowed quantum operations. More
precisely, this model takes into account interactive converters (and models the
computation in sequential dependent stages). This is similar to if one would in
the classical world instantiate the converter by a sequence of classical Turing
machines (passing state to each other) [Gol01].
2.2 Notation
We denote by Zπ2 the set of the 4 angles {0, π2 , π, 3π2 }, and Zπ4 = {0, π4 , ..., 7π4 } the
similar set of 8 angles. If ρ is a quantum state, [ρ] is the classical representation
(as a density matrix) of this state. We also denote the quantum state |+θ〉 :=
1√
2 (|0〉+ e
iθ |1〉), where θ ∈ Zπ4 , and for any angle θ, [θ] will denote [|+θ〉〈+θ|],
i.e. the classical description of the density matrix corresponding to |+θ〉. For a
protocol P = (P1, P2) with two interacting algorithms P1 and P2 denoting the
two participating parties, let 〈P1, P2〉 denote the execution of the two algorithms,
exchanging messages. We use the notation C to denote the classical channel
resource, that just forwards classical messages between the two parties.
3 Impossibility of Composable Classical RSP
In this section, we first define what RSP tries to achieve in terms of resources and
subsequently quantify the amount of information that an ideal RSP resource must
leak to the server. One would expect that, against a computationally bounded
distinguisher, the resource can express clear privacy guarantees (i.e. a small
amount of leakage), but we prove that it cannot be the case.
The reason is as follows: assuming that there exists a simulator making the
ideal resource indistinguishable from the real protocol, we can exploit this fact to
construct an algorithm that can classically describe the quantum state given by
the ideal resource. It is not difficult to verify that there could exist an inefficient
algorithm (i.e. with exponential run-time) that achieves such a task. We show that
even a computationally bounded distinguisher can distinguish the real protocol
from the ideal protocol whenever a simulator’s strategy is independent of the
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classical description of the quantum state. This would mean that for an RSP
protocol to be composable there must exist a simulator that possesses at least
a classical transcript encoding the description of a quantum state. This fact
coupled with the quantum no-cloning theorem implies that the most meaningful
and natural RSP resources cannot be realized from a classical channel alone. We
finally conclude the section by looking at the class of imperfect (describable) RSP
resources which avoid the no-go result at the price of being “fully-leaky”, not
standard, and having an unfortunately unclear composable security.
3.1 Remote State Preparation and Describable Resources
We first introduce, based on the standard definition in the Constructive Cryptog-
raphy framework, the notion of correctness and security of a two-party protocol
which constructs (realizes) a resource from a classical channel C.
Definition 2 (Classically-Realizable Resource). An ideal resource S is
said to be ε-classically-realizable if it is realizable from a classical channel in the
sense of Definition 1.
A simple ideal prototype that captures the goal of a RSP protocol could be
phrased as follows: the resource outputs a quantum state (chosen from a set of
states) on one interface and a classical description of that state on the other
interface to the client. For our purposes, this view is too narrow and we want to
generalize this notion. For instance, a resource could accept some inputs from the
client or interact with the server, and it may still be possible to use this resource
to come up with a quantum state and its description. More precisely, if there is
an efficient way to convert the client and server interfaces to comply with the
basic prototype above, then such a resource can be understood as RSP resource,
too. To make this idea formal, we need to introduce some converters that witness
this:
1. A converter A will output, after interacting with the ideal resource, a classical
description [ρ] which is one of the following:
(a) A density matrix (positive and with trace 1) corresponding to a quantum
state ρ.
(b) The null matrix, which is useful to denote the fact that we detected some
deviation that should not happen in an honest run.
2. A converter Q, whose goal is to output a quantum state ρ′ as close as possible
to the state ρ output by A.
3. A converter P , whose goal is to output a classical description [ρ′] of a quantum
state ρ′ which is close to ρ (cf. Definition 3).
An RSP must meet two central criteria:
1. Accuracy of the classical description of the obtained quantum state: We
require that the quantum state ρ described by A’s output is close to Q’s
output ρ′. This is to be understood in terms of the trace distance.
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2. Purity of the obtained quantum state: Since the RSP resource aims to replace
a noise-free quantum channel, it is desirable that the quantum state output





to one. Since ρ′ is required to be close to ρ, this implies a high purity of ρ as
well.
It turns out that these two conditions can be unified and equivalently captured
requiring that the quantity Tr(ρρ′) is close to one. A rigorous formulation of this
claim and its proof is provided in the full version of this work [BCC+20].
An RSP resource (together with A and Q) can also be seen as a resource
whose accuracy can be easily tested. For example, if such a resource outputs a
state ρ′, instead of |φ〉 (i.e. [ρ] = [|φ〉〈φ|]), then one way to verify this behavior
would be to measure ρ′ by doing a projection on |φ〉. This test would pass with
probability ps := 〈φ|ρ′|φ〉, and therefore if the resource outputs correct state (i.e.
if ρ′ = |φ〉〈φ|), the test will always succeed. However, when ρ′ is far from |φ〉〈φ|,
this test is unlikely to pass, and we will have ps < 1. We can then generalize
this same idea for arbitrary (eventually not pure) states by remarking that
ps = 〈φ|ρ′|φ〉 = Tr(|φ〉〈φ|ρ′) = Tr(ρρ′). Indeed, this last expression corresponds
exactly to the probability of outputting E0 when measuring the state ρ′ according
to the POVM {E0 := ρ,E1 := I − ρ}, and since the classical description of ρ
is known, it is possible to perform this POVM and test the (average) accuracy
of the resource.When ρ is pure, the expression is equal to the (squared) fidelity
between ρ and ρ′. This motivates the following definition, which characterizes
the set of RSP resources.
Definition 3 (RSP resources). A resource S is said to be ε-remote state
preparation resource (or equivalently, a remote state preparation resource within
ε with respect to converters A and Q) if the following three conditions hold: (1)
both converters output a single message at the outer interface, where the output [ρ]
of A is classical and is either a density matrix or the null matrix, and the output
ρ′ of Q can be any quantum state of same dimension as ρ; (2) the equation:
E
([ρ],ρ′)←AS`Q
[ Tr(ρρ′) ] ≥ 1− ε (3)
is satisfied, where the probability is taken over the randomness of A, S and Q,
and finally, (3) for all the possible outputs [ρ] of ([ρ], ρ′)← AS ` Q, if we define
E0 = ρ, E1 = I − ρ, then the POVM {E0, E1} must be efficiently implementable
by any distinguisher.
Describable resources. So far, we have specified that a resource qualifies as an
RSP resource if, when all parties follow the protocol, we know how to compute a
quantum state on the right interface and classical description of a “close” state
on the other interface. A security-related question now is, if it is also possible
to extract (possibly inefficiently) from the right interface a classical description
of a quantum state that is close to the state described by the client. If we find
a converter P doing this, we would call the (RSP) resource describable. The
following definition captures this.
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Definition 4 (Describable Resource). Let S be a resource and A a converter
outputting a single classical message [ρ] on its outer interface (either equal to
a density matrix or the null matrix). Then we say that (S,A) is ε-describable
(or, equivalently, that S is describable within ε with respect to A) if there exists a
(possibly unbounded) converter P (outputting a single classical message [ρ′] on
its outer interface representing a density matrix) such that:
E
([ρ],[ρ′])←ASP
[ Tr(ρρ′) ] ≥ 1− ε (4)
(the expectation is taken over the randomness of S, A and P).
Reproducible converters. In the proof of our first result, we will encounter a
crucial decoding step. Roughly speaking, the core of this decoding step is the
ability to convert the classical interaction with a client, which can be seen as an
arbitrary encoding of a quantum state, back into an explicit representation of
the state prepared by the server. The ability of such a conversion can be phrased
by the following definition.
Definition 5 (Reproducible Converter). A converter π is said to be repro-
ducible if there exists a converter π̃ such that the following holds
Cπ ≈Du0 Cπ̃T , (5)
where π̃, possibly inefficient converter, outputs only a classical message [ρ′] at its
right interface, and T takes as input on its inner interface a classical description,
[ρ′], of a quantum state ρ′ and reproduces the exact same quantum state ρ′. The
indistinguishability requirement is with respect to any unbounded distinguisher
D ∈ Du and the subscript “0” refers to perfect indistinguishability. Since C
represents classical channel and is a neutral resource, the above condition can be
equivalently written as π ≈Du0 π̃T . This is pictorially represented in Fig. 3.
π = π̃ T
ρ [ρ′] ρ′
Fig. 3: Reproducible converter.
Classical communication and reproducibility. We see that in general, being repro-
ducible is a property that stands in conflict with the quantum no-cloning theorem.
More precisely, the ability to reproduce implies that there is a way to extract
knowledge of a state sufficient to clone it. However, whenever communication is
classical, quite the opposite is true. This is formalized in the following lemma.
12
Intuitively, it says that in principle it is always possible to compute the exact
description of the state from the classical transcript and the quantum instruments
(circuit) used to implement the action of the converter. The following statement
is proven in the full version of this work [BCC+20].
Lemma 1. Let π = (πi)i be a converter, where πi are quantum instruments
corresponding to the successive rounds of the protocol π. Then π is reproducible
if (i) it receives and transmits only classical messages from the inner interfaces,
and (ii) it outputs at the end a quantum state on the outer interface.
3.2 Classically-Realizable RSP are Describable
In this section we show our main result about remote state preparation resources,
which interestingly links a constructive notion (composability) concerning a
computational notion with an information-theoretic property (describability). As
a consequence, we obtain the impossibility of non-describable RSPCC composable
protocols (secure against computationally bounded distinguishers). While this
connection does not rule out all the possible RSP resources, it shows that most
useful RSP resources are impossible. Indeed, the describable property is usually
not desirable, as it implies an unbounded adversary could learn the description of
the state it received from an ideal resource. To illustrate this theorem, we will see
in the Section 3.3 some examples showing how this result can be used to prove
the impossibility of classical protocols implementing some specific resources, and
in Section 3.4 we give a brief outline how “imperfect” resources could escape the
impossibility result.
Theorem 1 (Classically-Realizable RSP are Describable). If an ideal
resource S is both an ε1-remote state preparation with respect to some A and
Q and ε2-classically-realizable (including against only polynomially bounded
distinguishers), then it is (ε1 + 2ε2)-describable with respect to A. In particular,
if ε1 = negl(n) and ε2 = negl(n), then S is describable within a negligible error
ε1 + 2ε2 = negl(n).
Proof. Let S be an ε1-remote state preparation resource with respect to (A,Q)
which is ε2-classically-realizable. Then there exist πA, πB , σ, such that:
E
([ρ],ρ′)←AS`Q
[ Tr(ρρ′) ] ≥ 1− ε1 (6)
πACπB ≈ε2 S ` (7)
and
πAC ≈ε2 Sσ (8)
Now, using (7), we get:
AπACπBQ ≈ε2 AS ` Q (9)
So it means that we can’t distinguish between AS ` Q and AπACπBQ with
an advantage better than ε2 (i.e. with probability better than 12 (1 + ε2)). But,
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if we construct the following distinguisher, that runs ([ρ], ρ′) ← AS ` Q, and
then measures ρ′ using the POVM {E0, E1} (possible because this POVM is
assumed to be efficiently implementable by distinguishers in D), with E0 = [ρ]
and E1 = I − [ρ] (which is possible because we know the classical description of
ρ, which is positive and smaller than I, even when [ρ] = 0), we will measure E0
with probability 1− ε1. So it means that by replacing AS ` Q with AπACπBQ,
the overall probability of measuring E0 needs to be close to 1−ε1. More precisely,
we need to have:
E
([ρ],ρ′)←AπACπBQ
[ Tr(ρρ′) ] ≥ 1− ε1 − ε2 (10)
Indeed, if the above probability is smaller than 1 − ε1 − ε2, then we can
define a distinguisher that outputs 0 if it measures E0, and 1 if it measures




[ Tr(ρρ′) ] + 12 E([ρ],ρ′)←AπACπBQ
[ Tr((I − ρ)ρ′) ] (11)
>
1
2 ((1− ε1) + 1− (1− ε1 − ε2)) =
1
2(1 + ε2) (12)
So this distinguisher would have an advantage greater than ε2, which is in
contradiction with Eq. (9).
Using a similar argument and Eq. (7), we have:
E
([ρ],ρ′)←ASσπBQ
[ Tr(ρρ′) ] ≥ 1− ε1 − 2ε2 (13)
We will now use πBQ to construct a B that can describe the state given by
the ideal resource. To do that, because πBQ interacts only classically with the
inner interface and outputs a single quantum state on the outer interface, then
according to Lemma 1, πBQ is reproducible, i.e. there exists a B such that
πBQ ≈0 BT . Note that here B is not efficient anymore. Of course, the proof does
apply when the distinguisher is polynomially bounded. Therefore, we have:
E
([ρ],ρ′)←ASσBT
[ Tr(ρρ′) ] ≥ 1− ε1 − 2ε2 (14)
T could be omitted as it only converts the classical description [ρ′] into ρ′. After
defining P = σB, we have that S is (ε1 + 2ε2)-describable.
3.3 RSP Resources Impossible to Realize Classically
In the last section, we proved that if an RSP functionality is classically-realizable
(secure against polynomial quantum distinguishers), then this resource is de-
scribable by an unbounded adversary having access to the right interface of that
resource.
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Our main result in the previous section directly implies that as long as there
exists no unbounded adversary that, given access to the right interface, can find
the classical description given on the left interface, then the RSP resource is
impossible to classically realize (against QPT distinguishers). Very importantly,
this no-go result shows that the only type of RSP resources that can be classically
realized are the ones that leak on the right interface enough information to
allow a (possibly unbounded) adversary to determine the classical description
given on the left interface. From a security point of view, this property is highly
non-desirable, as the resource must leak the secret description of the state at least
in some representation. In this section, we present some of these RSP resources
that are impossible to realize classically. The proofs of all results from this section
can be found in the full version of this work [BCC+20].
Definition 6 (Ideal Resource SZπ2 ). SZπ2 is the verifiable RSP resource (RSP
which does not allow any deviation from the server), that receives no input, that
internally picks a random θ ← Zπ2 , and that sends θ on the left interface, and
|+θ〉 on the right interface as shown in Fig. 1.
Lemma 2. There exists a universal constant η > 0, such that for all 0 ≤ ε < η
the resource SZπ2 is not ε-classically-realizable.
Next, we describe a verifiable remote state preparation RSPV, a variant of
SZπ2 , introduced in [GV19]. Unlike SZπ2 , in RSPV, the dishonest server can make
the resource abort and the client can partially choose the basis of the output
state. However, similar to the SZπ2 , we prove that classically-realizable RSPV is
also not possible.
Definition 7 (Ideal Resource RSPV, See [GV19]). The ideal verifiable
remote state preparation resource, RSPV, takes an input W ∈ {X,Z} on the left
interface, but no honest input on the right interface. The right interface has a
filtered functionality that corresponds to a bit c ∈ {0, 1}. When c = 1, RSPV
outputs error message ERR on both the interfaces, otherwise:
1. if W = Z the resource picks a random bit b and outputs b ∈ Z2 to the left
interface and a computational basis state |b〉 〈b| to the right interface;
2. if W = X the resource picks a random angle θ ∈ Zπ4 and outputs θ to the
left interface and a quantum state |+θ〉 〈+θ| to the right interface.
Corollary 1. There exists a universal constant η > 0, such that for all 0 ≤ ε < η
the resource RSPV is not ε-classically-realizable.
Remark 1. Note that our impossibility of classically-realizing RSPV does not
contradict the result of [GV19]. Specifically, in their work they make use of an
additional assumption of the so-called measurement buffer, see section Section 1.2.
However, we show that it is impossible to realize this measurement buffer resource
with a protocol interacting purely classically, therefore the measurement buffer
recreates a quantum channel. Additionally, this method has a second drawback:
the server can put a known state as the input of the measurement buffer, and if
15
the dishonest server passes the test (an event that occurs with probability 1n ),
then he can check that the state has not been changed, leading to polynomial
security (a polynomially bounded distinguisher can distinguish between the ideal
and the real world). As in CC, the security of the whole protocol is the sum of
the security of the inner protocols, any protocol using this RSP as a sub-module
will not be asymptotically secure (against QPT distinguisher).
3.4 Accepting the Limitations: Fully Leaky RSP resources
As explained in the previous section, Theorem 1 rules out all resources that are
impossible to be describable with unbounded power, and that the only type of
classically-realizable RSP resources would be the one leaking the full classical
description of the output quantum state to an unbounded adversary, which we
will refer to as being fully-leaky RSP. Fully-leaky RSP resources can be separated
into two categories:
1. If the RSP is describable in quantum polynomial time, then the adversary
can get the full description in polynomial time. This is not an interesting
case as the useful properties that we know from quantum computations (such
as UBQC) cannot be preserved if such a resource is employed to prepare the
quantum states.
2. If the RSP is only describable using unbounded power, then these fully-leaky
RSP resources are not trivially insecure, but their universally composable
security remains unclear. Indeed, it defeats the purpose of aiming at a nice
ideal resource where the provided security should be clear “by definition”
and it becomes hard to quantify the impact of this additional leakage when
composed with other protocols. A possible remedy would be to show restricted
composition following [JM17] which we discuss in the full version of this
work [BCC+20], where we also present a concrete resource that falls into this
second category, i.e., one that leaks an encoding of the classical description
of the final state that is not trivially decodable.
4 Impossibility of Composable Classical-Client UBQC
In the previous section, we showed that it was impossible to get a (useful)
composable RSPCC protocol. A (weaker) RSP protocol, however, could still be
used internally in other protocols, hoping for the overall protocol to be composably
secure. To this end, we analyze the composable security of a well-known delegated
quantum computing protocol, universal blind quantum computation (UBQC),
proposed in [BFK09]. The UBQC protocol allows a semi-quantum client, Alice,
to delegate an arbitrary quantum computation to a (universal) quantum server
Bob, in such a way that her input, the quantum computation, and the output of
the computation are information-theoretically hidden from Bob. The protocol
requires Alice to be able to prepare single qubits of the form |+θ〉, where θ ∈ Zπ4
and send these states to Bob at the beginning of the protocol, the rest of the
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communication between the two parties being classical. We define the family of
protocols RSP8−statesCC as the RSP protocols that classically delegate the preparation
of an output state |+θ〉, where θ ∈ Zπ4 . That is, without loss of generality, we
assume a pair of converters PA, PB such that the resource R := PACPB has the
behavior of the prototype RSP resource except with negligible probability. Put
differently, we assume we have an (except with negligible error) correct RSP
protocol, but we make no assumption about the security of this protocol. Therefore,
one can directly instantiate the quantum interaction with the RSP8−statesCC at
the first step as shown in Protocol 1. While UBQC allows for both quantum
and classical outputs and inputs, given that we want to remove the quantum
interaction in favor of a completely classical interaction, we only focus on the
classical input and classical output functionality of UBQC in the remaining of
the paper.
Protocol 1 UBQC with RSP8−statesCC (See [BFK09])
– Client’s classical input: An n-qubit unitary U that is represented as set of
angles {φ}i,j of a one-way quantum computation over a brickwork state/cluster
state [MDF17], of the size n×m, along with the dependencies X and Z obtained
via flow construction [DK06].
– Client’s classical output: The measurement outcome s̄ corresponding to the
n-qubit quantum state, where s̄ = 〈0|U |0〉.
1. Client and Server runs n×m different instances of RSP8−statesCC (in parallel) to obtain
θi,j on client’s side and |+θi,j 〉 on server’s side, where θi,j ← Zπ4 , i ∈ {1, · · · , n},
j ∈ {1, · · · ,m}
2. Server entangles all the qubits, n× (m− 1) received from RSP8−statesCC , by applying
controlled-Z gates between them in order to create a graph state Gn×m
3. For j ∈ [1,m] and i ∈ [1, n]
(a) Client computes δi,j = φ′i,j+θi,j+ri,jπ, ri,j ← {0, 1}, where φ′i,j = (−1)s
X
i,jφi,j+
sZi,jπ and sXi,j and sZi,j are computed using the previous measurement outcomes
and the X and Z dependency sets. Client then sends the measurement angle
δi,j to the Server.
(b) Server measures the qubit |+θi,j 〉 in the basis {|+δi,j 〉 , |−δi,j 〉} and obtains a
measurement outcome si,j ∈ {0, 1}. Server sends the measurement result to
the client.
(c) Client computes s̄i,j = si,j ⊕ ri,j .
4. The measurement outcome corresponding to the last layer of the graph state (j = m)
is the outcome of the computation.
Note that Protocol 1 is based on measurement-based model of quantum com-
puting (MBQC). This model is known to be equivalent to the quantum circuit
model (up to polynomial overhead in resources) and does not require one to
perform quantum gates on their side to realize arbitrary quantum computation.
Instead, the computation is performed by an (adaptive) sequence of single-qubit
projective measurements that steer the information flow across a highly entangled
resource state. Intuitively, UBQC can be seen as a distributed MBQC where
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the measurements are performed by the server whereas the classical update of
measurement bases is performed by the client. Since the projective measurements
in quantum physics, in general, are probabilistic in nature and therefore, the
client needs to update the measurement bases (and classically inform the server
about the update) based on the outcomes of the earlier measurements to ensure
the correctness of the computation. Roughly speaking, this information flow is
captured by the X and Z dependencies. For more details, we refer the reader
to [RB01, Nie06].
Next, we show that the Universal Blind Quantum Computing protocol [BFK09],
which is proven to be secure in the Constructive Cryptography framework
[DFPR14], cannot be proven composably secure (for the same ideal resource)
when the quantum interaction is replaced with RSPCC (this class of protocol is
denoted as UBQCCC). We also give an outlook that the impossibility proof also
rules out weaker ideal resources.
4.1 Impossibility of Composable UBQCCC on 1 Qubit
To prove that there exists no UBQCCC protocol, we will first focus on the simpler
case when the computation is described by a single measurement angle. The
resource that performs a blind quantum computation on one qubit (SUBQC1) is
defined as below:
Definition 8 (Ideal resource of single-qubit UBQC (See [DFPR14])).
The definition of the ideal resource SUBQC1, depicted in Fig. 4, achieves blind
quantum computation specified by a single angle φ. The input (ξ, ρ) is filtered
when c = 0. The ξ can be any deviation (specified for example using the classical
description of a CPTP map) that outputs a classical bit, and which can depend
on the computation angle φ and some arbitrary quantum state ρ.
if c = 0 then
s̄ = M±φ |+〉
else







Fig. 4: Ideal resource SUBQC1 for UBQC with one angle, with a filtered (dashed)
input. In the case of honest server the output s̄ ∈ {0, 1} is computed by measuring
the qubits |+〉 in the {|+φ〉 , |−φ〉} basis. On the other hand if c = 1 any malicious
behavior of server can be captured by (ξ, ρ), i.e. the output s̄ is computed by





r ← {0, 1}
δ = θ + rπ + φ












Fig. 5: UBQC with one qubit when both Alice and Bob follows the protocol
honestly (see Protocol 1)
Theorem 2 (No-go composable classical-client single-qubit UBQC). Let
(PA, PB) be a protocol interacting only through a classical channel C, such that
(θ, ρB)← (PACPB) with θ ∈ Zπ4 , and such that (by correctness) the trace distance
between ρB and |+θ〉 〈+θ| is negligible with overwhelming probability. Then, if we
define πA and πB as the UBQC protocol on one qubit that makes use of (PA, PB)
as a sub-protocol to replace the quantum channel (as pictured in Fig. 5), (πA, πB)
is not composable, i.e. there exists no simulator σ such that:
πACπB ≈ε SUBQC1 `c=0, πAC ≈ε SUBQC1σ (15)
for some negligible ε = negl(n).
Proof. In order to prove this theorem, we will proceed by contradiction. Let us
assume that there exists (PA, PB), and a simulator σ having the above properties.
Then, for the same resource SUBQC1 we consider a different protocol π′ = (π′A, π′B)
that realizes it, but using a different filter `σ and a different simulator σ′:
π′ACπ′B ≈ε SUBQC1 `σ (16)
π′AC ≈ε SUBQC1σ′ (17)
More specifically, the new filter `σUBQC1 will depend on σ defined in Eq. (15).
Then our main proof can be described in the following steps:
1. We first show in Lemma 3 that SUBQC1 is also ε-classically-realizable by
(π′A, π′B) with the filter `σ.
2. We then prove in Lemma 4 that the resource SUBQC1 is an RSP within
negl(n), with respect to some well chosen converters A and Q (see Fig. 6)
and this new filter `σ.
3. Then, we use the main result about RSP (Theorem 1) to show that SUBQC1
is describable within negl(n) with respect to A (Corollary 2).
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4. Finally, in Lemma 6 we prove that if SUBQC1 is describable then we could
achieve superluminal signaling, a contradiction.
The above sequence of statements concludes the proof.
In the following, we give a brief overview of the above-mentioned statements
needed to conclude Theorem 2. The proofs of these statements are given in the
full version of this work [BCC+20].
Definition 9. Let π′ = (π′A, π′B) the protocol realizing SUBQC1 described in the
following way (as pictured Fig. 6):
– π′A = πA (Fig. 5)
– π′B: runs PB, obtains a state ρB, then uses the angle δ received from its
inner interface to compute ρ̃ := RZ(−δ)ρB, and finally outputs ρ̃ on its outer
interface and s := 0 on its inner interface.
Then we define `σ= σπ′B depicted in Fig. 7 (with σ being the simulator from
Eq. (15) above). We further let the converters A and Q be as described in Fig. 6.







s := 0s ρ̃ ρ̃
φ0←$ Zπ2
φ := −φ0
φ′ := φ0 + s̄π
[φ′]
r←$ {0, 1}
δ := θ + φ+ rπ
s̄ := s⊕ rs̄
Fig. 6: Definition of A, π′A, π′B and Q.
Lemma 3. If SUBQC1 is ε-classically-realizable by (πA, πB) with the filter `c=0
then SUBQC1 is also ε-classically-realizable by (π′A, π′B) with the filter `σ.
Lemma 4. If SUBQC1 is negl(n)-classically-realizable with `c=0 then SUBQC1
is an negl(n)-remote state preparation resource with respect the converters A
and Q and filter `σ defined in Fig. 6.
Now, using our main Theorem 1 we obtain directly that if SUBQC1 is classically-
realizable and RSP with respect to filter `σ, then it is also describable:
Corollary 2. If SUBQC1 is negl(n)-classically-realizable with respect to filter
`c=0 then SUBQC1 is negl(n)-describable with respect to the converter A described
above.







Fig. 7: Description of `σ
Lemma 5. Let Ω = {[ρi]} be a set of (classical descriptions of) density matrices,
such that ∀i 6= j, Tr(ρiρj) ≤ 1 − η. Then let ([ρ], [ρ̃]) be two random variables
(representing classical description of density matrices), such that [ρ] ∈ Ω and
E
([ρ],[ρ̃])
[ Tr(ρρ̃) ] ≥ 1−ε, with η > 6√ε. Then, if we define the following “rounding”
operation that rounds ρ̃ to the closest ρ̃r ∈ Ω:






[ RoundΩ([ρ̃]) = [ρ] ] ≥ 1−
√
ε (19)
In particular, if ε = negl(n), and η 6= 0 is a constant, Pr[ RoundΩ([ρ̃]) = [ρ] ] ≥
1− negl(n).
We state the last step of this sequence for which we give the proof here.
Lemma 6. SUBQC1 cannot be negl(n)-describable with respect to converter A.
Proof. If we assume that SUBQC1 is negl(n)-describable, then there exists a
converter P (outputting [ρ̃]) such that:
E
([ρ],[ρ̃])←ASUBQC1P
[ Tr(ρρ̃) ] ≥ 1− negl(n) (20)
We define the set Ω := {[|+θ′〉〈+θ′ |] | θ′ ∈ {0, π/4, ..., 7π/4}}. For simplicity, we
will denote in the following [θ] = [|+θ〉〈+θ|].
In the remaining of the proof, we are going to use the converters A and P
together with the ideal resource SUBQC1, to construct a 2-party setting that would
C D
A SUBQC1 P P ′
[ρ̃] φ′π
= φ0 mod π
φ0←$ Zπ2
Fig. 8: Illustration of the no-signaling argument
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achieve signaling, which would end our contradiction proof. More specifically, we
will define a converter D running on the right interface of SUBQC1 which will
manage to recover the φ0 chosen randomly by A.
As shown in Fig. 8, if we define C as C := ASUBQC1 and D the converter
described above, then the setting can be seen equivalently as: C chooses as
random φ0 and D needs to output φ0 mod π. This is however impossible, as
no message is sent from SUBQC1 to its right interface (as seen in Fig. 8) (and
thus no message from C to D), and therefore guessing φ0 is forbidden by the
no-signaling principle [GRW80].
We define P ′ as the converter that, given [ρ̃] from the outer interface of P
computes [φ̃] = RoundΩ([ρ̃]) and outputs φ̃π = φ̃ mod π (as depicted in Fig. 8).
We will now prove that φ̃π = φ0 mod π with overwhelming probability.
All elements in Ω are different pure states, and in finite number, so there
exist a constant η > 0 respecting the first condition of Lemma 5. Moreover from
Eq. (20) we have that SUBQC1 is ε-describable with ε = negl(n), so we also have
(for large enough n), η > 6
√
ε. Therefore, from Lemma 5, we have that:
Pr
([ρ],[ρ̃])←ASUBQC1P
[ RoundΩ([ρ̃]) = [ρ] ] ≥ 1− negl(n) (21)
But using the definition of converter A, we have: [ρ] = [φ′], where φ′ = φ0 + s̄π,




[ φ̃π = φ0 mod π ] ≥ 1− negl(n) (22)
However, as pictured in Fig. 8, this can be seen as a game between C =
ASUBQC1 andD = PP ′, where, as explained before, C picks a φ0 ∈ Zπ2 randomly,
and D needs to output φ0 mod π. From Eq. (22) D wins with overwhelming
probability, however, we know that since there is no information transfer from C
to D, the probability of winning this game better than 1/2 (guessing the bit at
random) would imply signaling.
4.2 Impossibility of Composable UBQCCC on Any Number of Qubits
We saw in Theorem 2 that it is not possible to implement a composable classical-
client UBQC protocol performing a computation on a single qubit. In this section,
we prove that this result generalizes to the impossibility of UBQCCC on compu-
tations using an arbitrary number of qubits. The proof which can be found in
the full version of this work [BCC+20] works by reducing the general case to the
single-qubit case from the previous section.
Theorem 3 (No-go Composable Classical-Client UBQC).
Let (PA, PB) be a protocol interacting only through a classical channel C, such that
(θ, ρB)← (PACPB) with θ ∈ Zπ4 , and such that the trace distance between ρB and
|+θ〉 〈+θ| is negligible with overwhelming probability. Then, if we define (πGA , πGB)
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as the UBQC protocol on any fixed graph G (with at least one output qubit, that
uses (PA, PB) as a sub-protocol to replace the quantum channel, (πGA , πGB) is not
composable, i.e. there exists no simulator σ such that:
πGACπGB ≈ε SUBQC `c=0, πGAC ≈ε SUBQCσ (23)
for some negligible ε = negl(n), where SUBQC is a trivial generalization of
SUBQC1 to multiple qubits (defined in [DFPR14] under the notation Sblind) for
which an additional leakage lψA is send to the server, which is (at least in our
case) equal to the size of the graph state.
5 Game-Based Security of QF-UBQC
While we know from Theorem 3 that classical-client UBQC (UBQCCC) cannot
be proven secure in a fully composable setting, there is hope that it remains
possible with a weaker definition of security. And indeed, in this section we show
that UBQCCC is possible in the game-based setting by implementing it using a
combination of the known quantum-client UBQC Protocol 1 [BFK09] and 8-states
QFactory Protocol [CCKW19]. We start with giving a formal definition of the
game-based security of UBQCCC.
Definition 10 (Blindness of UBQCCC). A UBQCCC protocol P = (PC , PS)
is said to be (computationally) blind if no (computationally bounded) malicious
server can distinguish between runs of the protocol with adversarially chosen
measurement patterns on the same MBQC graph.
In formal terms, P is said to be (computationally) blind if and only if for any








, c′ ← A
]
≤ 12 + negl(λ),




denotes the interaction of
the two algorithms PC(φ(c)) and A.
Remark 2. Although, Definition 10 is written using the terminology of measurement-
based model. It doesn’t compromise the generality, as the model is universal and
can be easily translated into a circuit model, because the measurement pattern
and unitary operators are in a one-to-one mapping.
5.1 Implementing Classical-Client UBQC with QFactory
The UBQC protocol from [BFK09], where the quantum interaction is replaced
by a RSP8−statesCC protocol, is shown in Protocol 1. In this section, we replace
the RSP8−statesCC protocol with a concrete protocol proposed in [CCKW19]. This
protocol, known by the name of 8-states QFactory (we consider the case where
abort occurs with negligible probability) exactly emulates the capability of
RSP8−statesCC . The resulting protocol contains a QFactory instance for each qubit
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that would have been generated on the client’s side. The keys to all QFactory
instances are generated entirely independently by the client.
Unfortunately, considering the results from Section 4 there is no hope that the
composable security of any UBQCCC may be achieved. Nonetheless, letting go of
composability, we can prove the game-based security for this specific combination
of protocols. This leads us to the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 4 (Game-based Blindness of QF-UBQC). The protocol resulting
from combining the quantum-client UBQC protocol with QFactory is a (computa-
tionally) blind implementation of UBQCCC in the game-based model according to
Definition 10. We call this protocol QF-UBQC.
The proof of Theorem 4 which will be given in the remainder of this section
and follows two main ideas:
1. Every angle used in the UBQC protocol has only eight possible values, and
can, therefore, be described by three bits. In the protocol, the first bit is
the one for which QFactory cannot guarantee blindness. Fortunately, the
additional one-time padding in UBQC allows analyzing the blindness of the
protocol independently of the blindness of exactly this first bit. Therefore,
it suffices to rely on the blindness of the last two bits which is conveniently
guaranteed by QFactory and the hardness of LWE.
2. To analyze the leakage about the last two bits during a QFactory run, it
is sufficient to notice that the leakage is equal to a ciphertext under an
LWE-based encryption scheme. The semantic security of this encryption
scheme and the hardness assumption for LWE guarantee that this leakage is
negligible and can be omitted.
In more detail, the 8-states QFactory protocol which is used here consists
of two combined runs of 4-states QFactory, each contributing with a single bit
(hidden from the server) to the three-bit encoding of the angles used in the
UBQC protocol. The formulae for how these angles from the 4-states protocol
are combined in the 8-states protocol can be found in [CCKW19]. If the basis
bit B1 is the hidden bit of the first 4-states QFactory instance and basis B′1 the
hidden bit of the second instance, then we obtain:
L1 = B′2 ⊕B2 ⊕ [B1 · (s1 ⊕ s2)], L2 = B′1 ⊕ [(B2 ⊕ s2) ·B1], L3 = B1, (24)




are computed by the server, and
B2 = f(sk, B1, y, b), B′2 = f(sk′, B′1, y′, b′) (25)
for some function f , QFactory secret keys sk, sk′, and server-chosen values
y, b, y′, b′.
The two 4-states QFactory instances now leak the ciphertext of B1 and
B′1, respectively. Given the semantic security of the encryption, after a run of
8-states QFactory, L2 and L3 remain hidden, while the blindness of L1 cannot be
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guaranteed by QFactory. This fact is going to be crucial. Due to space constraints,
we give here the security proof for the single-qubit case. By induction, the
security proof can be extended to apply to UBQC for MBQC computations on
a polynomial number of qubits. The proof is given in the full version of this
work [BCC+20].
Lemma 7 (Blindness in the single-qubit case). The protocol resulting
from combining the quantum-client UBQC protocol with (8-states) QFactory is a
(computationally) blind implementation of UBQCCC in the game-based model for
MBQC computations on a single qubit.
Proof. We start with the real protocol, describing the adaptive blindness of
QFactory combined with single-qubit UBQC. In the following, we denote the
set of possible angles by M = {jπ/4, j = 0, . . . , 7}. The encryption scheme that
appears in Game 1 is the semantically secure public-key encryption scheme from
[Reg09]. The two key pairs are generated independently on the challenger’s side.
Game 1:
Adversary Challenger










(B′1) Generate key pairs (sk, pk), (sk
′
, pk′)












5 : L1 = B′2 ⊕ B2 ⊕ [B1 · (s1 ⊕ s2)]
6 : L2 = B′1 ⊕ [(B2 ⊕ s2) · B1]
7 : L3 = B1
8 : r ←$ {0, 1}
9 : δ δ = φ(c) + L3π/4 + L2π/2 + L1π + rπ
10 : s
Compute guess
11 : c′ ∈ {0, 1} c
′
Check c′ = c?
In the following, instead of repeating the redundant parts of subsequent
games, we only present incremental modifications to Game 1. Any line that is
not explicitly written is assumed to be identical to the previous game.
Since s is never used by the challenger, we can remove it from the protocol
without distorting the success probability of the adversary. Next, we remove L1
from the protocol and from the calculation of δ. L1 is only used in the calculation
of δ, which can be expressed as δ = φ(c) + L3π/4 + L2π/2 + (L1 + r)π. Since
r is a uniform binary random variable with unique use in this line, (L1 + r) is

















5 : L1 = B′2 ⊕ B2 ⊕ [B1 · (s1 ⊕ s2)]...
9 : δ δ = φ(c) + L3π/4 + L2π/2 + L1π + rπ
10 : s
...
The next step introduces a (negligible) distortion to the success probability
of the adversary. By the semantic security of the employed encryption scheme,
no quantum-polynomial-time adversary can notice if the plaintext is replaced by
pure randomness except with negligible probability, even if information about the
original plaintext is leaked on the side. Therefore, replacing B′1 in the encryption
by independent randomness cannot lead to a significant change in the adversary’s
success probability. Further, since ciphertexts of independent randomness can
be equally generated by the adversary herself (having the public key), we can
remove the encryption of B′1 from the protocol altogether.
Game 3:
...




(B′1) Generate key pairs (sk, pk), (sk′, pk′)
...
Next, note that B′1 perfectly one-time pads the value of L2. This breaks the
dependency of L2 on B2, s2 and B1. It does not change the distribution of L2,
if L2 is instead directly sampled uniformly from {0, 1}. Since B2 is unused, we
remove it in the following game, and y, b, y′, b′, s1, s2 can be ignored.
Game 4:
...




, s1, s2 B2 = f(sk, B1, y, b)
...
6 : L2 = B′1 ⊕ [(B2 ⊕ s2) · B1] L2 ←$ {0, 1}...
By the same argument as for the transition from Game 2 to Game 3, we remove
the encryption of B1 from the following game. This introduces at most a negligible
change in the success probability of the adversary.
Finally, since the encryption scheme is not in use anymore, we can also remove
the key generation and the message containing the public key without affecting





pk(B1) Generate key pair (sk, pk)
...
We now see that δ is a uniformly random number, L2, L3, and r being i.i.d.
uniform bits. Therefore, the calculation and the message containing δ can be
removed from the protocol without affecting the adversary.
Game 6:
...
2 : B1, B′1 ←$ {0, 1}...
6 : L2 ←$ {0, 1}
7 : L3 = B1
8 : r ←$ {0, 1}
9 : δ δ = φ(c) + L3π/4 + L2π/2 + rπ
...
In Game 6, the inputs of the adversary are ignored by the challenger. Therefore,
the computation angles φ(1), φ(2) can equally be removed from the protocol:
Game 7:
Adversary Challenger





11 : Compute guess c′ ∈ {0, 1} c
′
Check c′ = c?
Game 7 exactly describes the adversary’s uninformed guess of the outcome of
an independent bit flip. Therefore, by a simple information-theoretic argument,
any strategy for the adversary will lead to a success probability of exactly 1/2.
The proof is concluded by a standard hybrid argument [BCC+20].
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